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DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF UNRELIABLE
EVIDENCE ADMITTED UNDER A LITERAL
INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 803-18
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Evidence 803-18,' the "learned treatise" excep-
tion to the Hearsay Rule, allows the introduction of learned
treatises into evidence to prove the matters asserted within. The
rule substantially increases the use of learned treatises from that
allowed in federal courts prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence' and from that allowed by a majority of the
states.
The Hearsay Rule of evidence is traditionally one of the most
difficult areas of law to master and apply. The very existence of the
rule is paradoxical. Although almost one-third of the evidentiary law
deals with hearsay problems, 3 the greater part is devoted to the ex-
ceptions and not the rule itself.' Hearsay evidence is defined' as "a
statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing offered as evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
6
1. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authori-
ty by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
FED. R. EVID. 803-18.
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence were approved on January 2, 1975, and
took effect on July 2, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1929.
3. Nokes, The English and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 167
(1956).
4. Booker & Morton, The Hearsay Rule, the St. George Plans and the Road
to the Year Twenty Fifty, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 7 (1968).
5. "Although approximately one third of the evidentiary decisions involve
hearsay evidence, most of those cases involve evidence admissible under one of the ex-
ceptions to the rule. It appears that a definition of hearsay can be based on knowing
what it is not, rather than what it is."
Maguire, The Hearsay System Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741
(1961).
6. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972).
Similarly, FED. R. EVID. 801(c) defines hearsay evidence as a "statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted".
Cagen: Dealing with the Problem of Unreliable Evidence Admitted Under a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
330 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
Historically, the transformation of the jury from a group of per-
sons with special knowledge of the facts at issue to a disinterested
group with no such information accounted for the creation of the
Hearsay Rule.' The rule evolved to guarantee that facts would be
developed by persons having firsthand knowledge.8
Three elements of firsthand testimony making it inherently
more trustworthy than hearsay are the oath,9 physical presence at
the trial," and the opportunity for cross-examination." However, the
rule has been liberalized to admit out-of-court or secondhand evi-
dence for two reasons. First, if circumstantial factors lend a high
degree of reliability to the hearsay evidence, the danger of present-
ing untrustworthy evidence to the fact trier which cannot be dis-
credited through cross-examination is greatly reduced. Second, when
the evidence is available only in hearsay form, and necessary to a
just disposition of the case, the information brought forth by hear-
say may be deemed so important that a high degree of trustworthi-
ness need not be proven. Courts consider both the trustworthiness
and necessity of evidence in determining whether it should be ex-
erupted from the Hearsay Rule. 2
7. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 800[02] (1977); J.
WIGMORE. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 1364 (6th ed. 1977).
8. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 800102].
9. J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISES ON EVIDENCE 47 (1898). While the oath
does not have the effect it historically held when fear of divine punishment would
make witnesses more truthful than without the oath, it does give the act of testifying
some semblance of solemnity. Furthermore, the witness may fear perjury prosecution,
and be more likely to testify truthfully than if the statement was not repeated under
oath. Id. at 47.
10. The trier of fact may be better able to judge the credibility of the witness
if he can observe the witness' demeanor while testifying. Also, the requirement of
physical presence makes false accusations more difficult; especially if the accused is
present at the trial. The constitutional right of confrontation of accusing witnesses, as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, rests on this rationale. C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 5, at § 245; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 7. at 1800101]; J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at
§ 1364.
11. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948). "Cross-examination is beyond a doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth". J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 1367.
The cross-examining party has a very strong motivation to highlight any weaknesses
in a witness's testimony or credibility. It is the inability to cross-examine an absent
declarant that is generally considered the most pressing reason for excluding hearsay
evidence. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at § 245.
12. "The principles of necessity and trustworthiness are not exclusive but are
intended to mutually supplement one another. Where one is weak, the other may com-
pensate and still provide an exception." Note, Learned Treatises and Rule 803(b)(18) of
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 126, 137 (1970). See also J.
WIGMORE. supra at note 5, at § 1420.
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The new Federal Rules of Evidence's codified existing common
law exceptions and, in addition, created many new exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule. The new rules deal with two types of exceptions;
where the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination,' and
where the declarant's availability is immaterial."5 The exceptions
listed in the latter group concern types of evidence that are very
likely to be trustworthy and should be admitted, despite their hear-
say form.
One type of evidence considered sufficiently trustworthy to
merit an exception to the Hearsay Rule is information contained in
learned treatises."6 The goal of Rule 803-18 is to bypass the necessity
of expensive and frequently unavailable expert testimony to prove
matters which, although unknown to the lay public, are undisputed
within the field of knowledge covered by the treatise. The major
fault of Rule 803-18 is its apparent failure to exclude the flood of
unreliable evidence that could be admitted under a literal inter-
pretation. Evidence meeting the specific criteria set forth in the rule
is presumed to be reliable. 7
Once evidence is determined to have met these criteria, the
court cannot, in the context of Rule 803-18, exclude evidence based
13. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
14. FED. R. EVID. 804 lists five types of evidence that are excepted to the
Hearsay Rule when the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination.
15. FED. R. EVID. 803 lists twenty four types of evidence that are excepted to
the Hearsay Rule.
16. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
17. Evidence submitted pursuant to Rule 803-18 must meet the following stan-
dards:
(1) The evidence must have the physical form of a "treatise, periodical,
or pamphlet".
(2) The evidence must have sufficient distribution to be considered
published.
(3) The writing must deal with history, medicine, or another art or
science.
(4) An expert in the field covered by the treatise must testify that the
treatise is authoritative.
These factors are more than mere guidelines to aid the court in their determina-
tion of whether the offered evidence has the requisite trustworthiness for admission.
The hearsay exceptions dealing with business and public records, 803-6 and 803-8,
specifically exclude the submitted evidence if untrustworthiness can be shown through
circumstantial evidence. The absence of such a savings clause in Rule 803-18 can only
mean that the drafters intended that the standards in the rule trigger an irrebuttable
presumption that the offered evidence is sufficiently reliable to warrant an exception
to the Hearsay Rule. See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
1980]
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on its own discretionary determination of its apparent unreliability. 8
However effective the requirements set forth in Rule 803-18 may be
as general indicators of reliability, they cannot, by themselves,
guarantee the trustworthiness of material submitted for admission
as substantive evidence.
This note has three purposes. It demonstrates that, as present-
ly drafted, Rule 803-18 does not adequately require a showing that
documents admitted are sufficiently trustworthy to merit an excep-
tion to the Hearsay Rule. In addition this note discusses the ra-
tionale for repealing 803-18. Finally and alternatively, this note il-
lustrates several methods by which evidence apparently admissible
under Rule 803-18, but still in an unreliable form, can be excluded.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
THE LEARNED TREATISE EXCEPTION
The notion that hearsay evidence is inadmissible is a relatively
recent concept in English legal history. 9 The establishment of the
Hearsay Rule has been attributed to the use of the jury as fact
finders," from which unreliable hearsay evidence was meant to be
kept. Another factor was the adversary system"' which, through the
vehicle of cross-examination, made it more likely than not that defi-
ciencies in evidence admitted would be made apparent. Most of the
18. Certainly, the court is not precluded from excluding evidence based on its
perception of unreliability. The court might determine to interpret the standards in
the rules to exclude much unreliable evidence. For example, although it might be
argued that an anonymous folded leaflet distributed on a public street is a "published
pamphlet" and eligible for admission, the court can and should interpret the distribu-
tion and form requirements of the Rule to exclude such obviously untrustworthy
evidence. See notes 117-19 infra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, a judicial determination of untrustworthiness can be used to ex-
clude unreliable evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 403.
However, these rules are meant to exclude evidence that is of so little value
that its defect cannot be cured, even by cross-examination. In instances where cross-
examination of the declarant is impossible, as in the admission of hearsay evidence, a
higher standard of reliability is necessary. The evidence that has a minimal degree of
probative value, and still meeting the standards of Rule 803-18 cannot be excluded by
other hearsay rules. See notes 126-143 infra.
The conspicuous absence of a trustworthiness requirement in Rule 803-18 ap-
parently prevents the court from using its own determination of reliability to exclude
marginally credible evidence, provided that evidence meets the standards set forth in
the rule.
19. J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1364.
20. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at § 245; J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1421.
21. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L.
REV. 247, 258 (1937); Morgan, 62 HARV. L. REV, supra note 11.
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attacks upon hearsay evidence have dealt with the presentation to
the jury of evidence in a form highly unlikely to be reliable."2 Hear-
say evidence is more suspect than firsthand testimony since the out-
of-court declarant is not testifying under oath,23 not physically pres-
ent at the trial, 4 and not subject to cross-examination.2" The Hear-
say Rule serves to keep unreliable evidence from the jury. However,
that rule has no justification when there are adequate circumstantial
guarantees of the trustworthiness of the evidence submitted.2"
Another cogent reason for admission of hearsay evidence is its occa-
sional necessity for a just determination of the case. The concerns of
trustworthiness and necessity, taken together, lay the foundation
for exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.27
Prior to enactment of the present Federal Rules of Evidence,
several types of written out-of-court assertions had been held to be
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. Writings containing facts so well
proven and known either within the general public domain or within
the community of the special field covered by the writing, have long
been excepted from the Hearsay Rule. Mortality tables,28 census
reports,' and almanacs 0 have traditionally been admitted into
evidence as exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.
However, texts containing facts which are not conclusively
proven and known have not generally been admissible to prove the
truth of the assertions contained within themselves.3 The only
22. J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1361.
23. Bridges v. Nixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945). See note 9 supra and accompa-
nying text.
24. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, (1895). See note 10 supra and
accompanying text.
25. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); Novicki v. Department of
Finance, 373 Ill. 343, 26 N.E.2d 130 (1940); J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1367. See
note 8 supra and accompanying text.
26. Maguire, 14 VAND. L. REV., supra note 5, at 749; Note, 62 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 21, at 179.
27. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
28. Mealey v. Slayton Machinery Sales, Inc., 508 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1975); Bair
v. American Motors Co., 473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1974); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1969); Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963);
Danzios v. Kelly, 112 Ill. App. 2d 14, 250 N.E.2d 801 (1969).
29. Pendry v. Addison, 105 Ga. App. 673, 125 S.E.2d 523 (1960); Fields v.
Jackson, 102 Ga. App. 117, 115 S.E.2d 877 (1960).
30. Minnesota Amusement Co. v. Larkin, 299 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1963); Gaphill
v. Bergman, 108 N.H. 507, 240 A.2d 55 (1968).
31. Hickok v. G. D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1974); Brown v.
United States, 419 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1970); Colwell v. Gardner, 386 F.2d 56 (6th Cir.
1967); Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1967); Cone v. Benjamin, 157 Fla. 800,
1980]
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means by which the information contained in a text dealing with dis-
puted facts could be admitted as substantive evidence was through
the testimony of an expert witness.2 Some jurisdictions have, how-
ever, altered this general rule by statute.
Statutory Alteration of Common Law
Several states have statutes allowing treatises to be used as in-
dependent evidence for specific types of cases. Massachusetts" and
Nevada" permit learned treatises to be used as substantive
27 So.2d 90 (1946); Isley v. Little, 237 Ga. 602, 131 S.E.2d 623 (1963); Hardin v.
Reynolds, 189 Ga. 534, 6 S.E.2d 328 (1939); Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399, 151 S.W.2d
790 (1939).
32. Expert witnesses, in gaining the background knowledge in their field of
expertise, must rely in part upon texts. The information presented in a textbook,
which has become incorporated into his general expert knowledge, has long been ad-
missible. This contention was aptly stated by Justice Holmes in Finnegan v. Fall River
Gas Works Co., 159 Mass. 311, 34 N.E. 523 (1893):
Although it might not be admissible merely to repeat what a
witness had read in a book, not itself admissible, still, when one who is
competent on the general subject accepts from his reading as provable a
matter of detail which he had not verified, the fact gains an authority
which it would not have had from the printed page alone, and, subject
perhaps to the exercise of some discretion should be admitted.
Id. at 529.
33. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233 § 79c (Supp. 1979), provides:
Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science or art con-
tained in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in so far
as the court shall find the said statements are relevant and the writer of
said statements is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on
the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice or
error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists,
hospitals, and sanitaria, as evidence tending to prove said facts or as opin-
ion evidence provided, however, that the party intending to offer as
evidence any such statements shall, not less than thirty days before the
trial of the action give the adverse party or his attorney notice of such in-
tention stating the name of the writer of the statements, the title of the
treatise, periodical, book, or pamphlet in which they are contained, the
date of publication of the same, the name of the publisher of the same,
and whenever possible or practical, the page or pages of the same on
which the said statements appear.
34. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.040 (1960) provides:
(1) A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained
in a published treatise, periodical, book, or pamphlet shall in the discre-
tion of the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the
writer of such statements is recognized in his profession or calling as an
expert on the subject be admissible in actions of contract or tort for
malpractice, error, or mistake against physicians, surgeons, chiropractors,
naturopathic physicians, hospitals, and sanitaria to prove the fact or as
opinion evidence.
(2) The party intending to offer as evidence any such statements shall,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1980], Art. 4
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evidence in medical malpractice trials. South Carolina allows use of
learned treatises in the proof of insanity. 5 Other statutes would ac-
cept such writings if their content, or authoritativeness of the
writing itself, can be made the subject of judicial notice. 6 Further-
more, several states have adopted the Uniform Code of Evidence,
which, like the Federal Rules, permits the substantive use of learned
treatises in all types of cases.3 7
The recent codification of federal evidence law' relaxed the
not less than three days before the trial of the action give the adverse
party notice of such intention stating the name of the writer of the state-
ment and the title of the treatise, periodical, book, or pamphlet in which
it is contained.
(Emphasis added). The Massachusetts and Nevada statutes differ from Rule 803-18 in
three areas. The use of the writing is limited to medical malpractice actions. Secondly,
both statutes require that the author, and not the treatise, as required by Rule 803-18,
be qualified as authoritative. Finally, the qualification determination is made by the
court, and not by an expert witness, as required by Rule 803-18.
35. S.C. CODE § 26-142 (1962), provides:
In all actions or proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the question
of sanity or the administration of poison or any other article destructive
to life is involved and in which expert testimony has been introduced,
medical or scientific works, or such parts thereof as may be relevant to
the issues involved shall be competent and admissible to be read before
the court or jury in addition to such expert testimony.
(Emphasis added). This statute differs from Rule 803-18 not only in the limited type of
cases in which the treatises could be used, but in the requirement that live testimony
accompany the treatise evidence. This apparent reluctance to decide a material issue
solely on the basis of learned treatise evidence was voiced in Apicella v. McNeil
Laboratory, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Seven states have adopted a general statute which reads: "historical
works, books on science or art, and published maps or charts made by persons indif-
ferent between the parties are prima facie (or primary, or presumptive) evidence of
facts of general notoriety." Since the court makes the determination of which works
are conclusive proof of the facts asserted, the court is effectively taking judicial notice
of the trustworthiness of the treatises. IDAHO CODE § 9-402 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §
622.23 (1950); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-1101-8 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1218
(1943); ORE. REV. STAT. § 41.670 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-6 (1953).
37. A published treatise of a periodical or pamphlet on a subject of
history, science or art [is admissible] to prove the truth of the matter
stated therein if the judge takes judicial notice or a witness expert in the
subject testifies that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable
authority in the subject.
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(31), adopted by Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460cc
(1964); the Canal Zone, C.Z. CODE TIT. 5 § 2962(31) (1963); and by the Virgin Islands, V.I.
CODE TIT. 5 § 932(31) (1957). In addition, the courts of Arkansas, Maine, Minnesota,
North Dakota, and Oklahoma have all adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence by
judicial promulgation.
38. The codification of federal evidence law was first proposed in 1962 by the
American Judicial Conference which prepared the proposed rules to the Supreme
Court in November, 1971. The court set forth the rules as its own on November 20,
19801
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Hearsay Rule to allow learned treatises that satisfy specific criteria
to be introduced into evidence, as contrasted with the former rule
allowing such admission only by way of impeachment. 9 The wording
of the rule differs from the Uniform Code of Evidence with respect
to admissibility in two respects. The Federal Rule prohibits the use
of learned treatises as exhibits and requires that they be read into
evidence." In addition, the portion of the treatise admissible is
1972, but Congress preempted the court's right to promulgate its own rules of
evidence. Congress passed Pub. L. No. 93-12, which kept the proposed rules from tak-
ing effect until Congress had approved them. The sweeping change in privileges allowed
to witnesses was considered a change in substantive law that required legislative ap-
proval. After a full hearing in both houses of Congress, the Federal Rules of Evidence
were approved on January 2, 1975, and took effect on July 1, 1975.
Congress added a provision allowing amendment of the Rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2076,
which required the Supreme Court to obtain congressional approval to propose an
amendment to any section dealing with privilege. The Court could amend any other
provisions by its own proposal, absent a specific congressional vote defeating the
amendment. See note 103, infra and accompanying text.
Hon. Elizabeth Holzman, a member of the House Judiciary Committee responsi-
ble for revising the proposed Rules of Evidence drafted by the Supreme Court, ex-
pressed grave doubts about the need for codification of the rules of evidence and con-
cern about the dangers that codification would inflict upon evidence law. In a state-
ment presented to the House Committee, she stated:
Black letter rules will make evidentiary points high profile.
Presently, evidentiary rulings are generally not considered critical at
trial. Once we adopt a 'black letter' code, lawyers will have a field day
determining how many evidentiary angels can dance on the top of a pin.
A number of witnesses testified that the rules will generate appeals and
increase reversals on evidentiary rulings.
Another thorny problem this codification will produce is forum
shopping. Because this code substantially liberalizes the Hearsay Rules,
federal courts may become a more attractive forum for litigation. This is
not the time to increase the work load of the already congested federal
courts. Nor is there any substantial justification on a hearsay issue for a
different outcome in a federal court where state law is involved .... In
making our decision, we should bear in mind the testimony of Judge
Friendly:
There is no need (for the proposed rules). Someone once said that
in legal matters, when it is not necessary to do anything, it is necessary
to do nothing . . . We know we are now having almost no serious prob-
lems with respect to evidence; we cannot tell how many the Proposed
Rules will bring.
Proposed Rules of Federal Evidence, Hearings Before the Judiciary Committee, on
H.R. 5496 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. (1973) (statement of Hon. Elizabeth Holzman).
39. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
40. See note 36 supra. Another minor addition Rule 803-18 makes to U.C.E.
63(31) is the inclusion of "medicine" as allowable subject matter of treatises eligible for
admission. Perhaps this conscious inclusion is an indication that FED. R. EVID. 803-18
was passed in part to aid the evidentiary plight of medical malpractice plaintiffs. See
note 95 infra and accompanying text.
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limited to the "extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examina-
tion."4 This limitation of the use of treatises as substantive evidence
to those situations in which an expert is on the stand and available
to explain and assist in the application of the treatise theoretically
guards against the possibility of the jury misusing the treatise.2
Rule 803-18 represents a substantial change in the use of learned
treatises as substantive evidence from that allowed in federal courts
before enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule lists
four separate criteria that a writing must meet to be eligible for ad-
mission. The work must have the physical form of a "treatise, peri-
odical, or pamphlet.""' The work must have sufficient distribution to
be considered published." The writing must have as its subject mat-
ter "history, medicine, or other science or art."'" Finally, the writing
must be qualified by an expert in the field of the treatise as being
authoritative." An explicit requirement that the writings eligible for
admission be deemed trustworthy is not present in the rule." In
comparison, several other federal rules'8 defining broad classes of
41. FED. R. EVID. 803-18 provides that learned treatise evidence is admissible
"to the extent called to the attention of expert witness upon cross-examination or
relied upon him by direct examination". The fact that the rule does not state any other
circumstances where the learned treatise can be introduced indicates that an expert
witness must be on the stand during the admission of the writing into evidence.
42. Supreme Court Advisory Note to Rule 803-18.
43. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Rules 803-6 and 803-7 deal with records of regularly conducted activity,
and the absence of such records, which are made exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opin-
ions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and it is was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method of cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or
not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803-6 (emphasis added).
(7) Absence of entry in reocrds kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance
19801
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writings granted hearsay exceptions do specifically require that the
writings not only meet the criteria stated in the rule, but have a re-
quisite degree of trustworthiness. This conspicuous absence of a
"savings clause" can only mean that the drafters of the rule did not
intend to require a judicial determination of trustworthiness. The
rule evidently creates a presumption that evidence meeting the
stated requirements is reliable enough to be excepted from the
Hearsay Rule. A judicial ruling of unreliability will be relevant to an
exclusion of evidence pursuant to Federal Rules 403 and 401."9 Un-
fortunately, application of those rules might not be able to exclude
much of the evidence which is admissible under Rule 803-18 yet not
sufficiently trustworthy to merit an exception to the Hearsay Rule.'
POTENTIAL OF ADMITTING UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE
UNDER A LITERAL APPLICATION OF RULE 803-18
As seen above, Rule 803-18 sets out four tests that a treatise
must pass before it is admitted into evidence for substantive pur-
poses.' Once these tests are met, the writing must be admitted into
with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonex-
istence of the matter, if the matter was a kind of which a memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved,
unless the sources of information or other curcumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803-7 (emphasis added). Rule 803-8 deals with the public records that are
considered eligible for admission over a hearsay objection.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, ex-
cluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803-8 (emphasis added).
49. Rule 401 deals with the definition of relevance. If the court determines
that the evidence submitted is so untrustworthy that it is totally without any pro-
bative value, the treatise may be excluded by operation of Rule 401. Similarly, Rule
403 requires that the prejudice, waste of time, etc., will exclude the evidence.
However, if an otherwise unqualified ditch digger makes an assertion about nuclear
physics in a treatise he authored, his opinion has so little credibility that it would not
have the tendency to make the existence of that assertion more probable than if that
evidence were not admitted. This probative value, the tendency to make the existence
of a material fact more likely than without the evidence, is also a factor in Rule 403.
50. See notes 126-36 infra.
51. See notes 44-47 supra.
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evidence. Under Rule 803-18, the judge has no discretionary power
to exclude evidence of dubious reliability that meets the above
criteria.2
Necessary Distribution
Any writing admissible under Rule 803-18 must be published as
opposed to being prepared for private use. The Advisory Note to
803-18, citing Wigmore, states that treatises are inherently trust-
worthy since they are "written primarily and impartially for the
professional, subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy with
the reputation of the writer at stake."5 A reputation-conscious
author of a treatise having a wide distribution within his profes-
sional community would certainly be motivated to be sufficiently ac-
curate in his work to withstand the attacks from his professional col-
leagues. The fact that a writing is published is, at the least, relevant
to the existence of such a motivation to write accurately. However,
the mere publishing of a writing does not guarantee its reliability.
The fact that a writing is published does not mean that the writing
is readily available from commercial outlets, or even that duplicate
copies exist. Federal courts have held that a writing is published
when it is put up for sale' or distribution. A "published" text might
have such a narrow distribution that the potential peer pressure
normally leveled at the writer of an unreliable text might not be
strong enough to motivate the author to write accurately. Even if
the treatise were distributed to all the members of the author's pro-
fessional community, he might not be motivated by peer pressure to
provide trustworthy information. The author himself might consider
his own published work too theoretical or speculative to be con-
sidered as authoritative. Indeed, the author may never have intend-
ed that his work be taken seriously, intending instead only to spark
a controversy in the field, or to write a tongue-in-cheek parody of a
treatise.55
52. See notes 48 and 49 supra.
53. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, Supreme Court Advisory Note.
54. United States v. Williams, 3 F. 484 (C.C.N.Y. 1880); United States v.
Baltimore Post Co., 2 F. 761 (C.C.N.Y. 1879). See also Kaplan v. Edmondson, 68 Ga.
App. 151, 22 S.E.2d 343 (1942); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23
N.W.2d 247 (1946). Some courts seem to require an effective distribution for a writing
to be considered published. Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 412, 49 S.E.2d 697 (1948)
(to make known before the public); Wolfe County Liquor Dispensary Ass'n v. Ingra,
272 Ky. 38, 113 S.W.2d 839 (1938) (a book is published only when it is offered for sale
or put into the general circulation).
55. Under a literal interpretation of Rule 803-18, Jonathan Swift's parody of
British aristocratic attitudes, A MODEST PROPOSAL (1874), in which the author proposed
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Additionally, not all treatises have disclosed authors. The facts
that an article has wide distribution, and that the author intended it
to be considered as reliable, have no effect on his motivation to be
accurate when the writing is published anonymously. The author is
immune from the attack on his reputation by his professional col-
leagues, since he cannot be associated with the unsigned writing. In
fact, authors who know that their writing is unreliable, or even
slanderous, may resort to anonymous authorship to avoid attack by
their colleagues or victims. Still further, the writing offered for
evidence may have been published without the author's consent or
knowledge. 6 The material may be so unreliable that the author
chose not to distribute it publicly, and was only published against
his wishes. Virtually any private writing might be admissible if
stolen and published by a third party. 7 Any of the above considera-
tions may indicate that the author did not intend his work to be con-
sidered trustworthy despite it having been published. If the author
does not take his own work seriously, the court should not accept
that writing without cross-examination.
Physical Form
A writing must not only be published to be eligible for admis-
sion under Rule 803-18, it must also be in the physical form of a
"treatise, periodical, or pamphlet."58 The terms, "periodical" and
that the overpopulation problem be solved by cannibalism, could be considered for ad-
mission as a treatise on methods of population control! Hopefully, such a piece of
evidence would not even be submitted to the court for introduction as substantive
evidence. Unfortunately, Rule 803-18 does not give the court discretion to exclude
evidence, although obviously not reliable, that complies with its standards. However,
the court has several evidentiary devices available to it that will exclude obviously
ludicrous evidence. Unfortunately, the irony of the writing might be so subtle that on-
ly experts could recognize its non-serious nature. If the writing has no obvious marks
of unreliability, there is no apparent reason for the court to exclude the evidence, nor
for the jury to disbelieve it. See notes 117-32 infra and accompanying text.
56. There is no specific requirement that the writing be published legally to
be admissible under Rule 803-18. Writings that are reprinted without the author's per-
mission, or even without his knowledge, are apparently eligible for admission. Thus,
virtually any writing that an individual might wish to reproduce and distribute could
be deemed "published".
57. Under the liberal definition of "publish", a stolen and coded diary could be
admissible evidence. More potentially abusive is the "publishing", by rummaging
through a researcher's waste basket for discarded information, and copying and
distributing the results of the study that he himself may have thought was not suffi-
ciently accurate for publication. The court might not be aware of the shady nature of
the publishing, and would have no clue as to the work's untrustworthiness. The
publishing of a document need not confer any guarantee of trustworthiness.
58. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
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"pamphlet", can be construed so that many writings in a physical
form highly unlikely to be reliable could be admissible. A pamphlet
might be no more substantial than a single, folded sheet of paper.59
Moreover, periodicals and pamphlets often tend to be speculative
and subjective in nature, making insurance of their truth by virtue
of being "learned treatises" most uncertain." Clearly Rule 803-18's
requirement that a document eligible for admission as substantive
evidence have the physical form of a treatise, periodical, or pam-
phlet does not exclude admission of writings that are in such an un-
substantial form that their reliability is highly suspect.
Material Eligible for Admission Under 803-18
A document judged a published learned treatise, periodical, or
pamphlet must also deal with "history, medicine, or other art or
science"'" to be eligible for admission under Rule 803-18. As with the
form and distribution requirements of the rule, the subject matter
standard is very easily met. Indeed, few nonfictional works could
not be construed as dealing with either an art or a science.2 It is ap-
parent from cases applying Rule 803-18, or related rules, that
treatises covering the fields of engineering," medicine," and phar-
59. The VII OXFORD BRITISH ENGLISH DICTIONARY 410 (1970), defines a "pam-
phlet" as a "small treatise occupying fewer pages than a book". It would appear that a
pamphlet must have more than one page. A writing composed of only one page may be
in the form of a leaflet. Since there is no requirement in any definition of the word
pamphlet that it must contain more than one piece of paper, a pamphlet may have
more than one "page" by virtue of its being folded. By this literal definition of the
term pamphlet, a folded roadmap or menu could be eligible for admission under Rule
803-18. This type of hypertechnical distinction appears to be the precise sort of evil of
codifying evidence rules that was feared by Hon. Elizabeth Holzman, supra note 38.
60. Note, 5 VAL. U.L. REV., supra note 12, at 147. An author seeking to
publish his personal unorthodox opinions and theories may find little intellectual or
financial support from his professional colleagues. The prospective author may be forced
to present his material in an inexpensively produced pamphlet, or to have his work
printed in a trade periodical, rather than have his work published using more tradi-
tional and expensive media. The view that pamphlets may be inherently less reliable
than would be treatises was implied in Wiggins v. State, 39 Ala. 433, 104 So.2d 560
(1958). In this case, despite Alabama's liberal statute allowing admissibility of "learned
treatises, books, or pamphlets", ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 413 (repealed 1975), a pamphlet con-
taining only one case study was deemed to be too unreliable to be admissible.
61. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
62. The precise definition of "science" and "art" has baffled generations of
philosophers. The mere inclusion of such metaphysical terms in a statute is most unfor-
tunate. There appear to be no works of nonfiction that could not qualify as being
either an art or a science.
63. Bair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1974).
64. Walker v. North Dakota Eye Clinic, Ltd., 415 F. Supp. 891 (D.N.D. 1976);
Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp., 255 (E.D.Pa. 1976).
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macology" are considered to deal with "sciences". What is less clear
is the rule's treatment of submitted texts on astrology, alchemy, or
other such honored "sciences."8 Such material is especially suspect
since there is no scientific community scrutinizing the text to
motivate the author to write accurately. 7
One additional criterion used by state courts in interpreting
the term "science" is the degree of exactness of the general field of
knowledge dealt with by the text. 8 Interest tables69 and chemical
tables0 are said to deal with the "exact" fields of chemistry and
mathematics and are considered proper subjects for admissible
treatises. In comparison, a study dealing with jury behavior was
deemed inadmissible since it dealt with psychology, considered an
inexact field of knowledge. 1
Treatises dealing with rapidly developing sciences are
somewhat suspect. In the settled sciences, there is little subjective
interpretation from the compiler of the treatise. Relatively little op-
portunity exists for the author's bias to influence the writing and
hence, the necessity for cross-examination, or an inquiry into his
qualifications and techniques is minimized. In comparison, an inexact
science is a rapidly changing and uncertain field of knowledge in
which there is no set of conclusively agreed upon and universally ac-
cepted facts. Any assertion made in such a context relies heavily
upon a subjective analysis of the author. Since the subjective bias of
the author is such a strong influence on the contents of the treatise,
the jury must be aware of that bias to adequately evaluate the
work. Unfortunately, as the author is not available for cross-
examination, that vital information is not available to the jury.
65. Apicella v. Medical Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (excluded
on other grounds). Generella v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D.Pa. 1974).
66. The introduction of texts on such spurious fields of "knowledge" seems
ludicrous. Whether or not a given field is a "serious science" is a difficult question. For
example, acupuncture, once demeaned as unscientific, has gained credibility in the
scientific community. There are many such fields on the borders of accepted science
which enjoy at least a small degree of credibility. However, once the court considers a
topic as a science or art, the court has no discretionary power to exclude the evidence
based on its judgment of the writing's reliability.
67. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
68. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 1803(18)[01].
69. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. American Costal Lines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 923
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
70. Azoplate Corp. v. Silverlith, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 711 (D. Del. 1973).
71. Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304, 477 P.2d 971 (1970).
72. Fields such as anatomy and arithmetic where there is little controversy
could be classified as being relatively settled, as opposed to psychiatry and philosophy
which are highly speculative and unsettled.
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However useful the distinction between "exact" and "inexact"
sciences might seem in excluding unreliable evidence, the exactness
determination is not a guarantee of the treatises' trustworthiness.
This distinction would apply only to those treatises classified as
"science", and not those classified as "art" or "history"." Determin-
ing if a treatise deals with an exact or inexact science is difficult for
two reasons. Deciding under which field a given piece of information
should be classified can be an impossible task. A treatise dealing
with the causes of alcoholism could be considered as within the "ex-
act" field of biochemistry, or within the "inexact" field of
psychology. The method in which the subject is examined, and not
the subject matter itself, could apparently determine the arbitrary
classification of the treatise as "exact" or "inexact". Merely chang-
ing the method of analysis from subjective to objective in no way
makes the subject more precisely known. Secondly, even if the sub-
ject can be identified, and classified as exact or inexact, those terms
have little relevancy when applied to an entire field of knowledge.
There are many aspects of "exact" sciences, such as physics and
chemistry, which are very much in controversy. Perhaps a better
designation than "settled science" is "settled fact."
Although more useful than the "exact science" standard, the
proposed settled fact criteria still presents several serious problems
in practical application. Determining if a fact is settled within a
scientific community may be most difficult. The court might not be
aware of the extent of generally accepted knowledge within a field.
Of course, the experts in that field could testify that a given fact is
generally accepted as being true, but resorting to expert testimony
thwarts one of the reasons behind the rule; doing away with the
need for expensive and often unavailable expert testimony.74
In addition, if the fact sought is a physical measurement, such
as the melting point of a certain chemical, the result may be a "settled
fact" only to a certain degree of accuracy. Determining the amount
of experimental error in such measurements may also require the
expert testimony that is sought to be avoided by Rule 803-18."
73. Rule 803-18 specifically allows works concerning "history" and "art" to be
admitted. Evidently, a newspaper might qualify as "history", albeit very recent, and be
eligible for admission.
74. Comment, Evidence-Products Liability-Federal Rule of Evidence
803-18, 27 S.C.L. REv. 766 (1976). In addition, FED. R. EVID. 102 provides: "These rules
shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined". (Em-
phasis added). See also note 45 supra.
75. See note 74 supra.
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The subject matter requirement"6 is no more effective than the
distribution and physical form criteria in screening suspect evidence
from admission. At best, these factors are effects not causes, of
trustworthiness. The only other safeguard provided by Rule 803-18
is the qualification of the treatise as authoritative by expert
testimony or by judical notice.
Qualification of the Text
There is one final hurdle which the treatise must clear to be
admitted into evidence to prove the truth of its own assertions. The
treatise must be "established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony,
or by judicial notice."" At first glance the qualification requirement
excludes unreliable and outdated writings offered as substantive
evidence. The conclusive proof of the veracity of a document
eliminates the pressing need for requiring cross-examination and
negates the primary danger of admitting hearsay evidence. Applica-
tion of the qualification requirement, however, poses several prac-
tical problems.
The court may take judicial notice of the facts within the
treatise if they are recognized as being generally known. Likewise,
the court may recognize that the authoritativeness of the submitted
writing is beyond dispute."8 If the accuracy of the work is so con-
clusively known that the judicial notice is proper, there is little
doubt that it is sufficiently reliable to merit admission under an ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule.
76. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
77. FED. R. Evm. 803-18, supra note 1.
78. Rule 201(d) states: "A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information". (Emphasis added). With respect to
judicial notice of the authoritativeness of a treatise, the "necessary facts" could be af-
fidavits from experts attesting to the book's reliability, data concerning the high
reputation of the author's writing, and institution sponsoring the treatise, data concern-
ing distribution of the treatise, and any other information that would be useful to the
court in determining its reliability. Presumably, counsel opposing admission would
have the opportunity to challenge the testimony presented in favor of the treatise.
If the submitting party can convince the court that the writing is authoritative
by presentation of such necessary facts, it may be admitted pursuant to Rule 201.
Application of this rule would allow admission of all treatises that can be shown
to be trustworthy and would exclude evidence of low or uncertain credibility.
In Generella v. Weinberger, 388 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Pa. 1974) the district court
held that an administrative judge abused his discretionary power to take judicial
notice when he read into evidence a medical text which was not otherwise certified as
being authoritative.
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Should the court refuse to take judicial notice of the trustwor-
thiness of a treatise, it must be established as a reliable authority
by expert testimony."9 Rule 803-18 does not state whether an expert
witness may qualify as authoritative on a treatise in a field outside
his own specialty. If specialists, expert in the topic covered by the
treatise, are not required to attest to its validity, the entire purpose
of having the text qualified may not be accomplished. A general
practitioner having only marginal experience in urology might
qualify as a "medical expert" and have the standing to certify
treatises in that speciality." He might, however, be totally unable to
judge whether that text represented the standard of the specialty
community.8 Moreover the rule requires only one expert to qualify
the text.2 If one general practitioner qualified a urology text as
authoritative, the court could apparently not consider the opinion of
the many urologists who might totally disagree with the text.83
Assuming that the witness qualifying the treatise as
authoritative must be expert in the specific topic of the treatise,
deciding what type of specialist is competent to qualify the text
poses serious problems. Many treatises of very narrow scope may
deal with a topic that is within the realm of several fields of
knowledge. For example, a text concerning the proper metal to used
in a hip prosthesis involves the fields of orthopedic surgery,
metallurgy, and mechanical engineering, among others. If such a
text can be qualified by an expert in any one of the different fields,
the danger of having a witness qualify a text in a field unfamiliar to
him is present. 4
A similar problem arises when the text is so broad in scope
that several fields are covered. An extensive treatise on internal
medicine may contain chapters covering biochemistry, anatomy, and
79. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
80. Note, 5 VAL. U.L. REV., supra note 12, at 147. The court may, of course,
require experts in the narrow field of the treatise to qualify the text, but this might
make qualification quite difficult. The purpose of the rule, elimination of expensive and
unavailable expert testimony, might be thwarted. See notes 103-106 infra and accompa-
nying text.
81. In addition, the generalist might have difficulty in aiding the court in the
interpretation of the treatise.
82. FED. R. EvID. 803-18, supra note 1.
83. However, the testimony of the general practitioner would have to have
enough credibility to establish the Work as authoritative. Once this requirement is
satisfied the court cannot exclude the evidence under 803-18 based on its own opinion
of the work's trustworthiness. See notes 17-19, and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 81 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
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pharmacology. The qualification of the entire work should require a
series of experts for each specialty topic included.
The requirement that an expert witness certify the text of-
fered for admission under Rule 803-18 would appear to exclude
unreliable evidence, though conforming with the standards of
physical form, distribution, and subject matter requirements listed
in Rule 803-18. However, the potential of witnesses qualifiying as
authoritative texts in fields with which they are minimally familiar
severely limits the effectiveness of the qualification requirements. 5
Rule 803-18 puts great importance on the qualification of the
text by expert testimony. Given the conspicuous absence of
language requiring a judicial determifation of trustworthiness,
drafters of the rule apparently intended to rely on the experts
rather than judges to determine the trustworthiness of the submit-
ted text. 6 Unfortunately, qualification by experts as prescribed by
Rule 803-18 is not an adequate substitute for a judicial determina-
tion of trustworthiness. The rule specifically requires only one "ex-
pert" to certify the text. Once a single expert has qualified the
text, the court can not consider the opinion of other, perhaps more
qualified, witnesses who might denounce the text to exclude it from
admission. Without the safety valve of a discretionary ruling on
trustworthiness," the potential of admitting highly suspect evidence
over a hearsay objection is imminent. Finally, there is no adequate
means of impeaching the suspect reliability of material that could be
admissible under Rule 803-18.
Difficulty of Impeaching Admitted Evidence
Any information contained in a "learned treatise", although
meeting all the requirements of Rule 803-18, may be rendered
unreliable by the normal advance of the state of knowledge within
any developing science." A formerly authoritative, but presently
outdated text, cannot be adequately discredited once admitted into
evidence. Several commentators claim that the antiquated treatise is
no less reliable than live testimony based on outdated views.9
85. Id.
86. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
87. FED. R. EVID. 803-18, supra note 1.
88. Such a "savings clause" is present in Rules 803-6, 803-7, and 803-8. See
note 49 supra and accompanying text.
89. J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1692.
90. Comment, Substantive Admissibility of Learned Treatises and the
Medical Malpractice Plaintiff, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 678 (1976); Note, Medical Treatises as
Evidence-Helpful But Too Strictly Limited, 29 U. CINN. L. REV. 255 (1960); J.
WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 1692.
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However, the expert presenting the outdated information, unlike the
author of the outdated treatise, must undergo a vigorous adversarial
cross-examination that will reveal any faults in his testimony. Pro-
ponents of Rule 803-18 might note that cross-examination of the
author is unnecessary since Rule 806 allows the introduction of
evidence impeaching the author of the treatise. 1 Certainly evidence
showing the poor reputation of an author is a very effective means
of discrediting his writings. Unfortunately many defects of the ex-
pert status of the author may only become apparent in the course of
cross-examination. For example, the fact that the author of a
medical text was only a "doctor" by virtue of an honorary degree
might become apparent only on cross-examination. Furthermore
Rule 806 is totally ineffective when the writing is published
anonymously92 since the reputation of an unknown author cannot be
impeached.
The credibility of the contents of the treatise may be impeached
by introducing, pursuant to Rule 803-18, treatises of opposite opin-
ion. However, in a developing science, highly reputable authors
often have conflicting explanations of phenomena of uncertain
origins. The mere difference of opinion does little to lower the
credibility of either author. Much more indicative of unreliability is
the use of substandard equipment and research techniques. This in-
formation is seldom present in the treatise itself, and can only be
learned through cross-examination of the author.
Extrinsic evidence impeaching the author, admitted under Rule
806, is far less damaging than is a vigorous, live cross-examination.
The jury would have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the author during the examination. Also, the counsel opposing ad-
mission can more effectively discredit a treatise which appears at
first glance to be trustworthy. 3 Rule 806 is a poor substitute for
91. FED. R. EvID. 806 provides:
When a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence which
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant testified as a witness.
Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsis-
tent with his hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that
he may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant
as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if
under cross-examination.
(Emphasis added).
92. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
93. There is little likelihood in an obviously bogus "treatise" being admitted
by the court, or believed by the jury. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
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adversarial cross-examination for impeaching the credibility of a
disreputable author, or of his writings.
The potential danger of admitting unreliable writings as
substantive evidence is great, given a literal interpretation of Rule
803-18. The hearsay evidence cannot be impeached by a cross-
examination of the declarant; nor does Rule 806 provide adequate
means to reveal the weakness of the evidence. For this reason, the
repeal of Rule 803-18 should be considered.
RATIONALE FOR REPEAL OF RULE 803-18
The argument for repealing the potentially abusable Rule
803-18 becomes stronger when that rule is shown to be both ineffec-
tive in achieving its main goal, and usurped by other more effective
evidentiary devices. Despite the high potential for abuse of Rule
803-18, the rule can be validly applied. However, information con-
tained in documents that are sufficiently trustworthy to merit an ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule can be admitted under another excep-
tion to the Hearsay Rule, or through the testimony of an expert
witness. In addition to being unnecessary, Rule 803-18 is largely in-
effective in solving one of the main problems that prompted its
enactment-the easing of the inability of malpractice plaintiffs to ob-
tain expert testimony.94 Finally, because of the unique amendment
Other discrediting factors such as shoddy research techniques and bias of the
author towards a certain result might only be evident after a cross-examination of the
author himself.
94. A report investigating medical malpractice compiled from a nationwide
survey of physicians was conducted by a commission established by the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. The Commission found that physicians were markedly
reluctant to testify in medical malpractice suits for the following reasons:
(1) Hesitancy to lose the time and income from practice that may be in-
volved in a court appearance.
(2) The inability to provide care to patients while testifying.
(3) The fear and resentment of attorneys by physicians while under-
going adversarial cross-examination.
(4) The natural reluctance to injure their fellow colleagues.
(5) The common belief that most malpractice claims are without merit.
U.S.DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMIS-
SION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, cited in Comment 71 Nw. U.L. REV., supra note 91, at
686 n.51.
Massachusetts and Nevada have both adopted statutes allowing the use of learned
treatises as independent evidence to specifically alleviate plaintiffs evidentiary disad-
vantage in malpractice actions.
The drafting change in FED. R. EVID. 803-18 which specifically mentions that a
treatise may deal with "medicine" may be significant in showing legislative intent that
Rule 803-18 was drafted to aid malpractice plaintiffs in obtaining expert medical
testimony. See note 39 supra.
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procedure of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule could be easily
repealed .
Rule 803-18 is not Needed to Admit Information Contained
in Reliable Treatises
Much of the reliable evidence that should be admitted under
Rule 803-18 can be admitted under other exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule. Stock market reports," records of vital statistics,97 and
laboratory reports98 are examples of types of statements that can be
admitted under both Rule 803-18, and other exceptions to the Hear-
say Rule. Furthermore, if the treatise is more than twenty years
old, it might be admissible under Rule 803-16."9 Many of the facts in
the "settled sciences"' "°° have been conclusively known for more than
twenty years. Such information could be presented in the form of
the older, although still reliable, text. Information contained in
government run studies might be admissible under Rule 803-8.10'
Also, if the information is compiled by a business as part of its
records, and is of the type of information usually recorded as part of
its normal business activity, it may be admissible under Rule
95. Sections not dealing with privileges may be amended by the court itself
absent a specific congressional veto of the change. See note 37 supra.
96. Market reports are admissible over a hearsay objection pursuant to FED.
R. EVID. 803-17, which provides: "Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or
other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by per-
sons in particular occupations" shall not be barred by the Hearsay Rule.
97. Records of vital statistics are exempted by FED. R. EVID. 803-9. The rule
specifically exempts from the Hearsay Rule: "Records or data compilations, in any
form of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report was made to a public of-
fice pursuant to requirements of law."
98. Business records are excepted from the Hearsay Rule by Rule 803-6. See
note 49 supra.
99. FED. R. EVID. 803-16 grants an exception to the Hearsay Rule for those
"statements in a document in existence twenty years or more, the authenticity of
which is established".
100. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
101. FED. R. EVID. 803-8 states:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to
duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, ex-
cluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack
of trustworthiness.
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803-6.112 The records of an independent testing laboratory, containing
results of certain relevant tests performed, might be admissible
under this rule. Finally, any piece of hearsay evidence is admissible
as proof of a material fact under 803-24, the so-called "catch-all" ex-
ception to the Hearsay Rule,"3 if sufficient trustworthiness and
necessity can be shown. Although huge quantities of unreliable hear-
say could be considered as "business records" or "government
records", the rules specifically require that the court find the sub-
mitted evidence trustworthy.1 4 There is no such expressed require-
ment of a judicially determined finding of reliability required in
Rule 803-18. For this reason, application of other exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule are preferable to 803-18.
The Main Purpose of 803-18 is not Achievable
It is very possible that a prudent interpretation of Rule 803-18
could not solve one of the major problems leading to its enactment,
the evidentiary plight of malpractice plaintiffs. 5 If available at all to
plaintiff, expert testimony in malpractice cases is expensive and
time consuming.106
102. Records of regularly conducted activities are granted an exception to the
Hearsay Rule by FED. R. EvID. 803-6. The rule defines such records as:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any form, of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by or
from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, if kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was.the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the
method of circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustwor-
thiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit.
(Emphasis added).
103. FED. R. EVID. 803-24 states:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is of-
fered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
ponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by ad-
mission of the statement into evidence ....
104. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
106. Id.
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The treatise submitted for admission must still be qualified as
authoritative by an expert in the field covered by the treatise. '07
Members of a tightly knit professional community who are reluctant
to personally testify against their colleagues 8 would also be unlike-
ly to consider as authoritative a text that strongly damages their
peers.
Once the book is qualified as authoritative, the malpractice
plaintiff must still call a witness to be present on the stand while
the treatise is being read into evidence. Rule 803-18 limits the use of
the treatises "to the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination, or relied upon by him in direct ex-
amination. . . . "" The rule does not provide for the introduction of
the treatise into evidence other than in the course of the testimony
of an expert witness."0 If the plaintiff is able to obtain expert
testimony, the treatise may be presented to the extent relied upon
by that expert. Unfortunately, determining the precise extent to
which an expert has relied on any given treatise in the formation of
an opinion is most difficult."' If the plaintiff is unable to find experts
to testify on his behalf, he must present the treatise during the ex-
amination of the defendant-physician. Although there appears to be
no limit to the extent which the treatise may be used on cross-
examination,"2 the damaging effect of the treatise may be blunted
by its interpretation by the defendant. The defendant may tend to
distinguish some of the more harmful aspects of the treatise as be-
ing irrelevant to the facts of the case."'
107. FED. R. EvID. 803-18, supra note 1.
108. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
109. FED. R. EvID. 803-18, supra note 1.
110. The requirement of having a witness on the stand during the introduction
of the treatise into evidence insures that an expert will be present to aid the court in
interpreting and applying the treatise for the jury. Supreme Court Advisory Note to
FED. R. EVID. 803-18.
111. Jones v. Bloom, 388 Mich. 98, 200 N.W.2d 196, 208 (1972) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
112. There are no reported cases where the use of a learned treatise was not
allowed in cross-examination of an expert witness because the treatise was not "suffi-
ciently called to the attention" of the cross-examined witness. Apparently, merely
reciting, "Let me call this section of this treatise to your attention", appears adequate
to bring the treatise within the allowable scope of use during cross-examination.
113. In Walker v. North Dakota Eye Clinic, Ltd., 415 F. Supp. 891 (D.N.D.
1976), a treatise concerning the dangers of a surgical procedure was admitted into
evidence under Rule 803-18. However, the defendant physician distinguished the text
on the grounds that the facts assumed by the writer of the text were different than
those present in the defendant's case history.
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Rule 803-18 might not only be ineffective in easing the eviden-
tiary handicap of malpractice plaintiffs, but might not reduce the
need for many expensively rented expert witnesses. The proper
qualification of a text's authoritativeness might require the
testimony of a battery of experts."' The expense involved in merely
qualifying the treatises could be so great that it could approach the
cost of live testimony. A prudent application of Rule 803-18 would
not appear to solve several of the problems for which it was designed.
Malpractice plaintiffs might find adequate expert testimony just as
unobtainable after the enactment of Rule 803-18 as it was before. 5
Rule 803-18 should be repealed. Application of the rule might
allow introduction of very unreliable evidence which cannot be ade-
quately impeached. Other evidence rules can be used to admit much
reliable evidence that would have been admissible under Rule
803-18. Even if the potential abuse of Rule 803-18 were cured, the
pressing problems creating the need for the rule would remain.
Finally, given the unique means of amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the unchallenged recommendation of the Supreme
Court,"' it is more likely that Rule 803-18 is more amenable to
legislative reform than are most statutes."7 However, until Rule
803-18 is repealed, courts should be made aware of the many devices
available to exclude evidence which, although meeting the re-
quirements of Rule 803-18, is so untrustworthy that it should not be
excepted from the Hearsay Rule.
If the party seeking admission of a treatise under Rule 803-18
can find one expert witness willing to testify on his behalf, the infor-
114. See notes 84 and 85 supra and accompanying text.
115. In evaluating the effect of a Massachusetts statute allowing substantive
use of treatises on the evidentiary plight of malpractice plaintiffs, one commentator
concluded: "In its fourteen years of operation it has changed the malpractice practice
only slightly. Malpractice plaintiffs still labor under a severe evidentiary handicap."
Kehoe, Massachusetts Malpractice Evidentiary Statute-Success or Failure?, 44 Bos.
U.L. REV. 10 (1964). See note 42 supra.
116. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
117. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. Judge Friendly articulated the
failure of legislators to adequately amend technical and procedural statutes.
The petty tinkering of the legal system which is necessary to keep
it in running order is not given proper attention by the legislator. The dif-
ficulty is rather that the Congressmen are too driven to be able to attend
to such matters .... [lit is not unusual for a member to devote 80% of his
time to dealings with constituents, and the demands on the remainder of
his time are enormous. Is it not strange that there is neglect of the un-
dramatic legislative activity as I have depicted?
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
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mation contained in the treatise can be admitted through the
testimony of an expert witness relying on the text. In federal
courts, the expert may base his opinion on any facts, hearsay in
form or not, if those facts are of the type reasonably relied upon by
other experts in his particular field in forming inferences or opin-
ions.118 If the treatises submitted for admission are of such a type,
the expert may base his testimony on the information contained in
them.
Since the expert would be restating the information contained
in the treatise, the jury might tend to associate his credibility as an
expert to the contents of the treatise. Contrarily, under Rule 803-18,
the treatise is read into evidence by the introducing party. There is
no aura of expert's credibility lent to treatises introduced into
evidence this way.
As with the alternative exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the ap-
plication of Rule 703 provides a guarantee of trustworthiness not
present in the application of Rule 803-18. Whether or not a treatise
is deemed to be reasonably relied upon by experts in the witness's
specialty is a judicial determination.19
METHODS BY WHICH UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
UNDER 803-18 CAN BE EXCLUDED FROM ADMISSION
Rule 803-18 could serve a useful function if the possibility of ad-
mitting unreliable evidence could be minimized. Evidence which has
a high degree of credibility and is only available in the form of a
learned treatise might not fit within one of the other hearsay excep-
tions. Until the Rule is repealed, or amended to include a specific re-
quirement of judicially determined trustworthiness, the courts
should work within other existing rules to minimize the potential
danger of Rule 803-18.
118. FED. R. EVID. 703 allows expert witnesses to base their opinions on facts
that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
(Emphasis added). This rule would allow introduction, through the testimony of an ex-
pert witness, of the information contained in certain reliable treatises.
119. The court will generally accept the expert witness's advice as to what
texts are generally considered reliable in his specialty. However, the court can exclude
the testimony if the treatise upon which it is based is obviously not of a type to be
trustworthy. This safeguard against untrustworthy evidence is not present in Rule
803-18.
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Restrictive Interpretation
Although there is no expressed provision in Rule 803-18 that
requires a judicial certification of the reliability of the evidence12
the court can exclude apparently unreliable evidence by restrictive-
ly interpreting the requirements stated in the Rule. Given an am-
biguity in the definitions of "publish" or "pamphlet" the court could
exercise discretion to interpret those terms 2' so that a "published
pamphlet" might be of a form likely to be trustworthy. The courts
could claim such an interpretation by claiming that Congress intend-
ed to exempt from the Hearsay Rule only that evidence which was
deemed sufficiently necessary or trustwortby so as not to require
cross-examination.122 The courts could restrictively interpret the
criteria of Rule 803-18 so that some of the writing of suspect form
and credibility that is currently admissible could be excluded.
There is little actual danger of a jury being misled by evidence
having a very unimpressive physical form and distribution. These
factors are obvious to the jury and would themselves greatly reduce
the credibility of the submitted writing. Much more dangerous is
the introduction of evidence which, although having the physical
form and distribution of a reliable treatise, is in fact inaccurate.
After all, the thick, impressively bound book gives no indication to
the jury of its unreliability. For this reason, the qualification of the
treatise by expert testimony is the most effective of the criteria in
the Rule in excluding unreliable evidence.
Raising the Standard of Qualification
A court may insure an adequate qualification of a treatise by
demanding that the expert certifying the text be qualified in the
specific, rather than general, field covered by the treatise. This re-
quirement would prohibit a generalist from qualifying as reliable
120. Unlike many other rules granting hearsay exceptions, Rule 803-18 does
not specifically contain a requirement of trustworthiness. See notes 42-53 supra and ac-
companying text.
121. The plain meaning rule, the rule of statutory construction that precludes
judicial interpretation of the terms in the statute, can only apply in those instances
where only one meaning can be assigned to the words in the statute. Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Since there is an inherent'ambiguity in the
language describing the requirements, the courts may use their discretion in shaping
the meaning of those terms to fit more closely with the intent of the legislature to ad-
mit only trustworthy evidence under an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
122. FED. R. EVID. 803-24 deals with the required degrees of trustworthiness
and necessity of evidence, not fitting any of the listed hearsay exceptions, which
should not be barred by a hearsay exception. The criteria of necessity and trustwor-
thiness are present in each of the listed exceptions in Rules 803 and 804. Note, 5 VAL.
U.L. REV., supra note 12, at 137.
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texts in fields with which he is only slightly familiar.' Placing
similarly strict requirements on the credentials of the expert on the
stand during the introduction of the treatise into evidence would
guarantee the presence of an expert well able to aid the court in in-
terpreting and applying the treatise.
The court might also make qualification of the text more dif-
ficult by requiring more than one expert to qualify the treatise. If
such a step was taken, the court would be applying its discretionary
judgment of the trustworthiness of the text instead of the certifica-
tion of the one expert witness required by Rule 803-18. This preemp-
tion of the expert's unilateral power to qualify the text could ex-
clude much of the suspect evidence that would be admissible under
the arbitrary and inflexible requirements of Rule 803-18.124
This approach was applied in a Kansas court'25 in interpreting a
statute' 21 containing the same requirement for qualification found in
Rule 803-18. The court held that the treatise was inadmissible
despite the fact that the required expert witness had testified to its
veracity. The court stated that "considerable judicial discretion is in
order for determining which works are trustworthy."'' 7 Even if the
court refuses to override the Rule's clear intent that only one ex-
pert is needed to qualify the text, different rules of evidence could
be used to exclude untrustworthy hearsay apparently admissible
under Rule 803-18.
Application of Rule 401
All admissible evidence must have the tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." This concept of relevancy, adopted by the Federal Rule
401, was applied in a Massachusetts court"' citing a rule"9 similar to
Rule 803-18. The court held that anesthesiology text published in
England was inadmissible, despite the required qualification by ex-
123. However, this raising of the standards for the qualifying witness may
make qualification itself more difficult. See notes 112 and 113 supra and accompanying
text.
124. If the court chose to interpret "authoritativeness established by expert
testimony" to be the consensus opinion of all expert testimony available, rather than
just one expert, this method would be proper.
125. Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304, 477 P.2d 971, 975 (1970).
126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460cc. (1964).
127. Zimmer v. State, 206 Kan. 304, 477 P.2d 971, 975 (1970).
128. FED. R. EVID. 401.
129. Ramsland v. Shaw, 341 Mass. 56, 166 N.E.2d 894 (1960).
130. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233 § 79c (Supp. 1979). See note 39 supra.
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pert witness. The court rationalized that since the standards of
anesthesia might be different in the United States than in England,
the English text was irrelevant to ascertaining the American stan-
dards. Additionally, an obviously bogus "treatise" could be deemed
to have no probative value and excluded by Rule 401. For example,
the fact that a faith healer makes certain assertions in a neurology
text might have no relevance to the truth of those assertions. Unfor-
tunately, evidence of minimal probative value may be deemed rele-
vant. Normally, the unreliability of the evidence will be made ap-
parent by cross-examination. With admission of hearsay evidence
this safeguard is not present. Therefore, the standard of relevance
is far too lax to exclude all the potentially misleading evidence ap-
parently admissible under Rule 803-18.' s'
Application of Rule 403
Assuming that the court finds that the offered treatise possesses
sufficient probative value to meet the relevancy requirement of Rule
401,32 the evidence must not violate the criteria set forth in Rule
403. That rule states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence."'1
This concept was applied in Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories131
where evidence that appeared to be admissible under both Rule
803-18 and Rule 703 was excluded on the grounds that the evidence
generated unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its pro-
bative value. The pamphlet offered for admission asserted that
defendant's product was dangerous, cited anonymous reports of
fatalities resulting from its use, and concluded that the drug should
be removed from the market. Defendant sought to compel the publi-
cation to release the names of those responsible for drafting the
report on the drug. The court denied the motion, restating the
strong public policy of protecting the confidential sources of jour-
nalists. However, the court recognized that defendant would be
"severely disadvantaged to refute"'" the assertions made in the
pamphlet without the requested information, and held that the pre-
judice outweighed the probative value of the evidence. The court ap-
131. See note 1 supra.
132. FED. R. EVID. 402 requires that all admissible evidence must be relevant,
according to the standards in FED. R. EVID. 401.
133. FED. R. EVID. 403.
134. 66 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
135. Id.
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parently did not exclude the evidence merely because of its low pro-
bative value.
The court added a second ground for exclusion, pursuant to
Rule 403, holding that the evidence, if offered, would substantially
confuse the issue:
There is a danger that the jury might focus on the ac-
curacy of the 1974 article rather than on the liability in
1972 when knowledge of the art may have been quite dif-
ferent. To the element of unfair prejudice in being unable
to cross-examine the experts who relied upon the article
is added the hazard of confusion and misleading the
jury.136
This concept of unfair prejudice may be used in criminal cases to ex-
clude from evidence a highly inculpating or prejudicial statement by
a declarant who is either unavailable for, or privileged from cross-
examination by defense counsel. If such information is contained in a
treatise admitted under Rule 803-18, the defendant's right to con-
front his accusers, as protected by the Sixth Amendment, may be
violated.' 37
Courts have generally held that the right to confrontation is
not violated by the admission of out-of-court statements which fit
within one of the established exceptions to the Hearsay Rule.'3
However, the rapid erosion of the Hearsay Rule'39 suggests a need
to reconsider whether the limitation of a constitutional right can be
tied solely to the minimally acceptable degree of trustworthiness
controlling the admission of hearsay evidence. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated that the right for a witness to confront his ac-
cusers is a right that the court "has been zealous to protect ... from
erosion."40
136. Id. at 86.
137. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. Co sw. amend. VI (emphasis added).
138. Cox v. United States, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Williams, 447 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1971); Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
1971).
139. See notes 3 and 4 supra and accompanying text.
140. United States v. Hampton, 419 U.S. 593 (1974).
1980]
Cagen: Dealing with the Problem of Unreliable Evidence Admitted Under a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
358 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.14
The court might avoid an unconstitutional application in
criminal cases of Rule 803-18 in two ways. It might simply require
the author of the writing to be available for cross-examination giv-
ing the defendant the opportunity to confront his accuser. If the
declarant is unavailable for cross-examination,"' the evidence could
be excluded under Rule 403 in that the prejudice of the evidence
substantially outweighs its probative value.
The other considerations of Rule 403, waste of time, and
needless cumulation of evidence," 2 could also be utilized to exclude
writings apparently admissible under Rule 803-18. The reading of an
entire lengthy volume into evidence, even if the information was
relevant and not overly prejudicial, may be excluded, or limited, to
the extent that the probative value is not outweighed by the waste
of time. A similar argument can be employed when the evidence
submitted is cumulative of the other evidence already introduced.
Not only may the court exclude seemingly admissible evidence
by finding extreme prejudice, delay, or confusion presented by the
evidence, it may consider the potentially low probative value of the
evidence, based on its unreliability. In this way, the court can direct-
ly apply its own determination of trustworthiness to the ultimate
admissibility of the writing." 3
Application of Rule 805
Evidence submitted pursuant to Rule 803-18 seems especially
susceptible to exclusion by operation of Rule 805,4 the "Double
Hearsay Rule." The rule requires that in order for a compilation of
hearsay statements to be admissible, each of the individual
statements must be admissible under an exception to the Hearsay
Rule. Articles which are hastily written, poorly packaged, and poor-
ly distributed are often the type of writing not considered authorita-
tive within the relevant professional community. These writings are
141. The declarant could be unknown or outside of the jurisdiction of the court.
The declarant might be exempt from cross-examination by operation of the attorney-
client privilege, newsman's privilege, or any other privilege against cross-examination
allowed by that jurisdiction.
142. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
143. This discretionary exclusion on the basis of a judicial determination of
trustworthiness is the key safeguard in the other exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
listed in Rule 803. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
144. FED. R. EvID. 805 provides: "Hearsay included within hearsay is not ex-
cluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with
an exception to the Hearsay Rule provided in these rules."
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often not based on the results of original research, or of painstaking
original analysis of the work of others, but consist of recitation of
statements of others.""5 Such writings would be likely to contain
more non-excepted hearsay assertions than would treatises of more
substantial physical form, enjoying wide distribution and high
respect among the professional community. Since the entire compila-
tion, and not just the non-excepted portion of the document is ex-
cluded, many ill-considered writings could be excluded by Rule 805.
Although there is no prohibition against the number of stages
hearsay evidence could pass through and still be admitted, prospect
of admissibility decreases with each level. Multiple hearsay is even
more suspect to the same objections which apply to simple
hearsay.1" Therefore, courts could consider that with each level of
hearsay, the reliability and probative value decreases to the point
where an exclusion under Rule 403 or Rule 401 would be proper. 14 17
Despite the apparent inflexibility of Rule 803-18 in admitting
any writings that conform to its criteria, reliable or not, there are
several means by which courts can use their discretion to exclude
unreliable evidence. A more restrictive reading of the requirements
of Rule 803-18, or application of the relevancy standard imposed by
Rule 401, would allow judicial input into the admissibility decision.
Furthermore, application of Rule 403 requires that the court balance
the unfair prejudice, waste of time, or confusion generated by the
treatise against its probative value. In determining a writing's pro-
bative value, the courts can use their judgment of the writing's
reliability. In this way, the discretion to exclude suspect evidence
that is lacking in Rule 803-18, but present in other rules, can be ap-
plied. Rule 805, the double hearsay standard, could also exclude
writings of a suspect nature which are more likely to contain non-
excepted hearsay assertions that would treatises that are in a form
likely to be reliable. Through these evidentiary devices, some of the
worst abuses of Rule 803-18 can be cured.
145. A major medical school would be more likely to possess and apply the
human and financial resources needed to perform the expensive original research
needed for a reliable medical text in a rapidly developing field. An unaffiliated and
unknown author would be less likely to have the needed resources available, and
would be more reliant upon statements of facts and opinions of other parties. Further-
more, the unknown and unsponsored author whose lack of credentials would make his
treatise's reliability suspect, would be less likely and able to publish his work in as
wide a distribution, or in as substantial a physical form as would the respected institu-
tionally sponsored author. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
146. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 805[01].
147. See notes 126-34 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of Rule 803-18 is valid. The utilization of reputable
learned treatises to prove generally accepted facts within a
specialized field of knowledge could apparently save countless hours
and dollars by doing away with the need for great quantities of cost-
ly and time consuming expert testimony. Rule 803-18 places certain
requirements on writings to be submitted as independent evidence
that would supposedly guarantee their trustworthiness. The writing
must be published; it must be in the form of a treatise, periodical, or
pamphlet; and it must deal with a subject of medicine, history, or
other art or science. Furthermore, the veracity of the text must be
certified by an expert witness. Rule 803-18 also requires that a
witness remain on the stand to help interpret the text, and that the
treatise not be admitted as an exhibit.
However, the safeguards employed by Rule 803-18 are not ade-
quate; the lenient standards allow evidence that is in a form highly
unlikely to be reliable to be admissible. According to a literal inter-
pretation of Rule 803-18, an unsigned, folded scrap of paper stolen
from the writer and passed to a third party could be eligible for ad-
mission. Evidence in such a form needs the device of cross-
examination to reveal its weakness to the jury.
Information contained in highly reliable treatises that should
rightly be admitted as independent evidence can be introduced into
evidence without resorting to Rule 803-18. Information contained in
such a writing is likely to fit one of the other exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule listed in Rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
addition, the facts within the treatise may be admissible through an
expert's testimony, pursuant to Rule 703. Because the above alter-
native rules allow judicial discretion in excluding unreliable
evidence, they are less prone to abuse than is Rule 803-18. In addi-
tion, if the rule is rationally interpreted the major evil that caused
the enactment of the rule, the evidentiary plight of malpractice
plaintiffs, cannot be remedied.
Rule 803-18 at best is superfluous, and at worst is dangerous.
Much evidence of questionable credibility will pass the standards in
803-18, but will not appear to be so obviously bogus that it will be
excluded by other Rules. The Rule should be amended to specifically
require a judicial determination of trustworthiness, or be repealed
entirely.
Richard M. Cagen
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